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PANEL FOUR: 
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW 
QUESTIONING PHILANTHROPY FROM A 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 
JILL E. FISCH. 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The panels in this program have described a variety of research 
projects on the topic of corporate philanthropy, but until this conference, 
corporate philanthropy had not received much attention from corporate 
lawyers. There are a number of reasons for this. First, corporate 
charitable donations and other philanthropic endeavors constitute a tiny 
percentage of a corporation's overall operations. i In the aggregate, 
corporate philanthropy rarely amounts to more than pennies per share. By 
comparison, corporate tender offers, which have been the focus of 
extensive legal and academic scrutiny, can involve premiums of as much 
as fifty percent over market price. The relative insignificance of corporate 
philanthropy. in dollar terms, means few investors are likely to complain 
about the manner in which this money is spent. 
Second, society is unlikely to be receptive ro shareholder complaints 
that charitable giving is inappropriate. In an age marked by the selfishness 
of the "me generation" and scarred by the claims of Wall Street that 
·'greed is good,'' it seems churlish for shareholders to object to the social 
responsiveness of a corporation that donates money to health, welfare. or 
1he environment. Charitable organizations. plagued by the shortage of 
private donations, look to corporations as the last potential somce of 
funding. Moreover, corporate decision-makers. reasonably enough, view 
Dhilanthropy as a means to coumer the oopular ima.ze of the cornoration 
�s a heartless and opportunistic Frankel�stein · s mon;ter. 2 
' 
---------------
* Proi':ossor of Law. Fordham Law School. Copyright !996. Jill E. Fisch. I Jm 
gr�1kful w Steve The! and my mother Ln thei 1· h�ipfui comments on eJrlier Jr:Jtts and for 
the �:tir�;L!Iating discussion by p:micipams in the Sympusiurn proc�edings. 
i. Se'! David R. Morgan. Trends in Co1poraie Clwrirable Conrriburions. ,q N.Y.L. 
SCH. L REV. 771. 786 (1997) (describing corporate giving patterns as ranging t'mm om; 
t·.• :wo per<:ent of profits since the 1950s). 
2. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee. 288 U.S. 517. 567 (1933) (Brandeis. J., 
dissentmg) (descrihing corporation as a "Frankenstein munstt:r"). 
1092 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIE W [Vol. 41 
Even if shareholders find corporate giving inappropriate, it is difficult 
to object when philanthropic activity has become a norm of business 
practice. Management scientists like Rikki Abzug explain that companies 
imitate their peers with respect to giving patterns, a practice she terms 
institutional isomorphism. 3 If donating at a specified level is standard 
operating procedure, how can shareholders complain about any particular 
company's decision to follow that procedure? 
Similarly, although regulators have taken the lead in initiating changes 
in some corporate governance practices,4 corporate philanthropy is unlikely 
to generate objections from government authorities. Increasingly, 
government is looking for ways to downsize, and in particular, to replace 
social services provided by government agencies with efforts by the private 
sector.5 Corporate giving provides the funding for private sector charity 
work that allows the government to reduce its role in financing social 
programs and, in an era of scarce tax dollars, reduce the demand for 
public funds. 
Corporate phiianthropy deserves more attention however than it has 
traditionally received, because the questions of how and whether 
corporations should donate are relevant to many modern themes in the 
corporate governance debate. Corporate law has attempted to evaluate 
appropriate business expenditures and the most effective way to run a 
business, most visibly in connection with research and development 
expenditures, 6 but also in areas such as political lobbying7 Charitable 
3. See Rikki Abzug & Natalie J. Webb, Rmional and E>:rra-Rmiorwl Morivmiorzs for 
Corporare Giv ing: Complemellling Economic Theory wirh Orga11iz.mion Science, 4 i 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1035, 1056-57 (1997). 
4. See, e.g., Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 29796, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,953, 51,953-
54 (Oct. 16. 1991) (approving American Stock Exchange rule ch�nge requiring all listed 
companies to have at least two independent directors and an audit committee comprised 
of a majority of inuependem directors); N.Y. STOCK EXCH .. N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED 
Co. MANUAL§ 303.00 (1995) (requiring all domestic companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange to have at least two outside directors and to have an audit committee 
comprised of independent directors); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Pub. 
L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.469-71 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162(111)(1993)) (adopting 
a deductibility cap for executive compc:nsaiion that is not performance based): Joel 
Seligman. The Fijlh A braham L. Pomeram::. Lecrure: The Ne1v Corporme Law. 59 
BROOK. L. REv. 1, 40-41 (1993) (describing history of amendments to the SEC 
requirement that corporations disclose executive compensalion). 
S. See, e.g . . Kim Nevin-Gank, Predicring rhe Phi!amhropic Response of 
Co;porarions: Lessons from Hisrory. Bus. HORIZO!'<S, May-June 1996, at 15; '.'·/hen 
Welfare Cases Land on Srare Playing Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1996, at E12. 
6. See, e.g . . Steven S. Cherensky, Shareholders, .Managers, a11d Cnrporcae R&D 
Spending: An Agency Cosr Model, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HlGH TECH. L.J. 
299, 301 (1994); Martin Lipton, Corpora!e Governance in rhe Age of Finance 
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giving raises similar questions. Is corporate philanthropy properly 
characterized as serving a business purpose? If so, does it demonstrate 
that corporations are not focused exclusively on short term profit 
maximization? lf philanthropy is not an ordinary business expense, should 
philanthropic decisions be treated with the same deference accorded to 
other business decisions?8 
The propriety of judicial deference to corporate philanthropic decisions 
also depends on the extent to which charitable giving creates a conflict of 
interest in the corporation and encourages management self-dealing. As 
Faith Kahn explains, charitable giving has been subject w less judicial 
scrutiny than more traditional business expenditures. 9 Yet Jayne Barnard 
cites egregious examples of management using corporate fcmds to further 
their personal, political, and social objectives.10 
More generaily, corporate philanthropy can be used as a vehicle for 
reconsideration of corporate purpose in general and the shareholder 
primacy model in particular. 11 Potentia.! shareholder objections to 
corporate giving can be addressed by invoking stakeholder models of 
corporate social responsibility, under which a corporation's decision to do 
good need not be defended on the basis that the corporation will thereby 
do well. 12 Charitable giving is a particularly useful model for examining 
the social responsibility question because it requires a more detailed 
analysis of the source of a corporation's imputed moral obligations. 
Finally, corporate philanthropy stimuiates an exa.mimtion of the 
corporation's political roie in society. Social 'NelfJre spending-wh2t 
should be spent and who should spend it-is an explosive political is:;w:: 
The demarcation between governn1ent and p6vate spending on puol i<� 
welfare is at rhe forefront of current debate. Although corporations c:an 
CorporrJism. 136 U. PA. L. REV. l. 8-9 (1987). 
7. Se:; generally f·..1irianl G3lston. Lobb_ving OJU! rhe ;D;.!l-:!ic Inttrr:sr: .Rethinking rh[: 
internal Revenue Code's Treaunenr of L egisiurive A ctivirit:s, 71 TEX. L. R:··/. \::.69 
(1993) (describing currefit rax r.rcaunent of co�pur::.tr: .lubbylng ::.:·.S 
8. Corporate bw generally protects the decision:� of rna�agetn�.::rt fr�'"rn _!udi(.-:iiil 
scrutiny thJt)ugh appl icatinn of the business _jwJgn""!ent ruk·. Sl.!e ,��en�rclly DE>i�.;;s J. 
BLOCK ET .-\L . . THE 8USI:'<ESS JUDCE1v1Ei'\T .RUI...E (•-7 (.:l£�� �J. l9S;3). 
9. See Fairh Stevein1Jn Kahn. Pandora ·s Box: /':4 culageri(:f _[)i:.cre::ion t.:i.!l'i ;h!�· 
Prvhle,on of Cotporaie Pitila!lrhro.oy, 44 U CL?, L. ��EV. 579. 59[..!.-609 ( 1997) (:_��:.crihing 
existing corporate law .st�.Lfutes th:.!t etuthurize char\t:.lbie dona.tic:ns irr.:!:�pscti'l:: of corporate 
benefit). 
I 0. See Jayne 1'tV. Barn::trd, Corporrue Phi!on��/u·t""Jp_v. E.Yecu:ivcs' Per Chttririe:. end 
rhe,.Jgcncy Problem. 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. il47 (l997). 
1 i. See ROBERTA RO\I.·\NO, THE GENITJS OF A�IER!CA:"r CCRFOR).T::: L.-\'H !.-3 
(i993) (defending i.hc shareho!d;:r primacy model Gf corporate governc\W:e). 
12. Sef! i;�fra r:otes 37-47 and Jcconlpanyi!lg text. 
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be viewed as pawns in the effort to coopt additional private funds for the 
public good, the result of funding social welfare expenditures through 
corporate philanthropy is to shift the responsibility for deciding which 
projects are worthy of funding into the hands of corporate decision­
makers. The effect of this shift is both to hide the decision-making 
process from shareholders in particular and the public more generally, and 
to create a system of social spending which is profoundly undemocratic. 
Il. THE RATIONALE FOR PHILANTHROPY FROM A 
CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE 
Corporate law's primary difficulty in formulating a methodology for 
evaluating corporate philanthropy is in understanding why corporations 
donate to charity. Nancy Knauer characterizes corporate philanthropy as 
a paradox: if corporations exist to maximize profits, and donations reduce 
profits, why do corporations donate money to charity?13 From a law and 
economics perspective, corporate charitable giving appears irrational. 14 
Fund-raisers and their counterparts in corporate giving departments 
offer a traditional response: charitable giving benefits the corporation. 15 
As Hildy Simmons explained, corporations donate because of enlightened 
self-interest. 16 There is no reason to be concerned about corporate 
philanthropy because corporations do well by doing good. This argument 
has held sway with the few courts that have considered the propriety of 
corporate philanthropy. These courts upheld discretionary corporate 
giving on the theory that donating to charity benefits the corporation. 17 
It is possible to identify many examples of donations that benefit the 
corporate donor. Corporate sponsors of the Olympics, for example, used 
sharitable giving as an alternative to other forms of advertising and 
marketing and enhanced their reputations at the same time. To the extent 
Ihat charitable donations provide a direct corporate benefit, however, they 
are not really philanthropic. Rather, donations that benefit the corporation 
13. See Nancy J. Knauer, The Pamdox of C01porrae Giving: Tar: Expendirures, rhe 
Narure of rhe Corporurion, and rhe Social Consrmuion of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1. 4 (1994). 
1�. See id. at 5. 
15. See id. at 49-79. 
16. See Hildy Simmons, Luncheon Address. 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1013. 1014 
( 1997). 
i 7. For cases upholding corporate philanthropy against shareholder challenges see 
I(ahn v. Sullivan. 594 A.2d 48. 61 (Del. 1991); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 
257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581. 590 
(t�.J. 1953). 
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should perhaps be recognized as an alternative form of business expense. 18 
This characterization renders the intellectual debate over the legitimacy of 
corporate contributions relatively superficial; no one questions the 
propriety of business expenditures that produce a corporate benefit. 
Although some of the value derived from charitable giving may be 
intangible or difficult to quantify, evaluating contributions that benefit the 
corporation from a legal perspective is similar to evaluating any other 
business expenditure. 
This analysis fails to explain the distinctive legal treatment of 
corporate philanthropy. If corporate donations are simply an alternative 
form of business expense, they require no independent authority under 
either corporate or tax law. Given that corporate business expenses are 
deductible from gross income, there is little need to resort to the charitable 
contribution analysis of § 17019 for the corporation to claim a tax 
deduction. 20 Although there are some differences between the tax 
treatment of corporate charitable contributions and that of business 
expenses, in general the choice of classification will have no tax 
consequences for the corporation. 21 
The explicit tax deduction for corporate charitable giving has been 
explained on political grounds. Providing an explicit deduction for 
corporate charitable contributions reflects a legislative endorsement of 
corporate philanthropy. Importantly, Congress initially issued this 
endorsement at a time when the legal status of corporate philanthropy 
under state law was unclear and when commerce clause concerns would 
have impeded direct federal efforts to authorize corporate philanthropy as 
a matter of substantive corporation law. 22 
From a corporation law perspective. the need for explicit statutory 
authorization for charitable giving may have stemmed from the difficulty 
early cases demonstrated in assessing the nature and amount of corporate 
18. See Joseph G:.!laskiewicz. CorporaJe Comriburions ro Charir,·: Norhing More 
I han a Markering Srrmegy. in PHILANTHROPIC GIVI:\G: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND 
GOALS, 246. 247 (Richard Magat ed., 1989) (arguing that advertising and contributions 
cannot be distinguished). 
19. Section 170 of the lnterll31 Revenue Code provides corporations with a deduction 
for charilahle comributions. For an analysis of the operation of§ 170. see Linda Sugin, 
Theories of rhe CorporaTion and rhe Tar Tremmenr of Cotpora!e Plzilamhropy, 41 N.Y. L. 
Scrr. L. REV. 835. 854-55 (1997). 
20. Indeed, the charitable deduction may be inconsistent with s !70's requ;r-:mem 
of charitable intent. See id. at 854-55. 
21. See Knauer, supra note 13, at 41-45. 
22. See id. at 15-20 (describing the history behind the adoption of § 170 by 
Congress). 
1096 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4! 
benefit generated by philanthropy. 23 It was unclear whether corporate 
spending to generate goodwill or enhance the corporation's reputation 
would be viewed as a legitimate exercise of corporate power. If a 
corporation were specifically empowered to donate money to charity, it 
would be unnecessary to establish the degree to which the corporation 
benefitted from the donation. Thus the statutes may be viewed as 
resolving legal uncertainty and difficult issues of proof. 
The evolution of the business judgment rule has rendered this objective 
obsolete, however. Corporate expenditures today are judged under the 
business judgment rule, a standard that accords substantial deference to 
management's judgment. 2.1 The fact that a perceived benefit is intangible, 
noneconomic, 01 • .. mcertain will not invalidate a corporate expenditure. 
Traditional corporate law standards create another problem, however, 
when used to evaluate contributions as business expenditures. The judicial 
deference accorded to such expenditures under the business judgment rule 
may not be appropriate in the context of philanthropic expenditures25 The 
business judgment rule is premised upon a presumption of management 
disinrerestedness. It is inapplicable in situations in which there is a 
possible conflict of interesc or self-dealing.26 As Jayne Barnard explains, 
although defenders of corporate phiianthropy claim it benefits the business, 
corporate giving is frequently motivated by rhe personal preferences of 
corporate executives who use their power to choose the recipients of large 
ccrpGrate grams in order !o support preferred causes or reap the social 
perquisites afforded to large donors. 27 Corporate donations may also 
assuage management's moral guilt, providing well-paid corporate 
23. Se-: K�lm. supra note 9. at 594-602 (describin� historic:�! treatment of 
philamhropy by corporate: law). 
2-+. The bu�;iness judgment rule creates ··�1 presumption that in making a business 
decision. not involving self-interest. the directors of a corporation acted on an informed 
h���is. in guoJ faith an:J in r.he l1D!1C:St belief tha( the actic)n takc:n w:..ts in the bc�·a interests 
<;f the r:ompany . .. Levine '1. Smith. 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991) (citations omitted). 
25. Sc·e E.C. L�shbrooke. Jr .. Jnremol Revenue Code Secrion 170 and rhe GreaJ 
c;orparare c.;i\'(.'(l\V(Z\'. :�2 PAC. L.J. 221 ( 1991) (arguing i.hat inanagers are the 
belh::fici2rl .. ;s of :ht ccii-pura.tion·s ch.;;.ritable contrlbuticns an1J are ther�:;hy breaching their 
duty�,-;· lt�y�dr.y tD �he ClJrp�._�rJtion by giving cway corpur:.ite assets). 
26_ See /-.ronson v. lev>'is, 473 A.2d 805. 812 (Del. 1924) (hoiding that fur a 
uar:sacion 'll be rnwc:cteu by the business judgm�nt rule ··direcwr� can neither appear 
Dn b�)�h siJes of a transc£ction nor expect to d�rivc any persPnal finan:�:ai benefit fron1 it 
in rhe st:nse of self-J,.:aling''). 
27 See B3ril2rd. supra note 10. at 1149; see also Kahn, supra note 9, at i 107 
(dr:;scribing \Vays in .,xhich philanthropy can serve ii1anagerial self-interest). 
:c ... .. , .. . 
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executives with the opportunity to be philanthropists at shareholder 
expense.28 
The possibility that corporate giving is motivated by management self­
interest rather than profit maximization is further supported by studies that 
fail to find a conclusive link between charitable giving and profitability. 29 
Of course, there are many possible explanations for these results. It is 
difficult to obtain firm-specific data, and further obstacles are presented by 
the problem of classifying the data and determining what to include as 
corporate philanthropy 30 Does cause-related marketing count?31 How 
should studies quantify gifts in kind or gifts of services?32 Should the 
public relations or advertising component of a donation be separated out? 
It is also difficult to assess the direction in which causation runs. 
Hildy Simmons describes the corporate decision about how much money 
to donate as a function of expected profits, that is, corporations target their 
giving level at a specified percentage of profits.33 If giving is a function 
of expected profits, there will obviously be an identifiable relationship 
between giving and profits, but the existence of that relationship does not 
support any conclusion about causality. 34 
28. This perspective can be seen in Henry Ford's defense of his decision to reduce 
prices on automobiles on the altruistic basis that the Ford Motor Co. had ·'made too much 
money" and should share its profits with the public. See Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668. 
684 (Mich 1919). 
29. See, e.g . . James R. Boatsman & Sanjay Gupta. Tar:es and Corporate Charity: 
Empiric al Evidencefromlvficro-Leve/ Panel D{aa. 49 NAT'L TAX J. 193 (1996) (finding 
data supporting the characterization of philanthropy as maximizing managers' utility rather 
than maximizing profits). But cf. Peter Navarro, Why Do C01pormions Give to ChC'Jity 7, 
61 J. Bus. 65, 65-66, 90 (1988) (citing previous empirical studies that have failed to 
explain the relationship between philanthropy and profitability but concluding, based on 
new data, that ·'profit maximization is an important motive driving contributions"). 
30. See Michelle Sinclair & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate-Nonprofit Pannerships: 
1/ arieties and Covariares, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1059, 1065-76 (1997) (describing 
reasons why it is difficult to measure the extent to which philanthropy benefits individual 
firms); see also Navarro. supra note 29, at 65 (citing the absence of firm-specific data). 
31. See Knauer, supra note 13, at 64 (describing cause-related nurketing). 
32. See. e.g., Karen Benezra, Companies Take New Approaches io Charitable 
Gn·ing. GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 25, 1993 (describing the Corporate Angel 
Network. which matches cancer patients with empty seats on corporate jets, as a 
phibnthropic program that saves the patients plane fare but does not cost the corporation 
anything). 
33. See Simmons, supra note 16. 
34. See Navarro, supra note 29, at 78 (recognizing that the correlation between 
giving and profitability is also consistem with a '"rule of thumb' method of determining 
contribution levels"). Studies such as that conducted by Sinclair and Galaskiewicz cast 
further doubt on the causal link by observing that substantial variance in corporate giving 
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Philanthropy i s  problematic for corporate law i f  economic studies 
ca!ll"10t establish that philanthropic decisions are profit maximizing. The 
problem arises, in part , because the law recognizes that the markets in 
which a corporation operates constrain management discretion within 
permissible limits. The discipline of the market provides a substitute for 
extensive regulatory oversight. Market checks also reduce the agency 
costs of corporate decision-making without the need for extensive 
shareholder involvement; the market operates as a monitor. 35 The market 
operates as a poor monitor for management decisions that are not tied to 
profit maximization, however, and traditional deference to management 
creates the possibility of self-dealing. 36 If the extensive enterprise of 
corporate philanthropy is spurred by the fact that management rather than 
the company benefits , then corporate law should respond by regulating 
corporate giving. 
Defenders of corporate philanthropy in terms of corporate social 
responsibility offer an alternative explanation. They suggest that corporate 
giving is not motivated by either management self-dealing or the quest for 
profit. Instead, corporate philanthropy has been described in terms of 
moral obligation. If corporations are viewed as moral actors with an 
obligation to serve society as well as shareholders , charitable donations 
may be viewed as part of that obligation. 37 This conception of corporate 
objectives is consistent \Vith the stakeholder model of corporate 
governance , in which the obligations of a corporation run to a variety of 
nonshareholder constituencies including employees, customers.  and 
members of the community. 3 8  Early supporters of broad fiduciary 
obligations for corporate management . the forerunners of the stakehold�C:r 
patterns exist  :.unong firms w i th s i m i l a r  levc:ls  of profitabi l i ty .  See S i nc l a i r  & 
Ga!askiewicz.  supra note 30. 
3 5 .  See genera/lv Ralph W i nter ,  State L mv .  Shcu·eholder ProteUion and the Theon 
cv·· rhe Corporation . 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 ( ! 977) (describing the manner in which rnarkd 
checks uffer a :;ubstitute for regulation as a means of monitoring corpora!e decis ion·· 
nlak ing) .  
36 .  See Kenneth B .  Dav is,  J r . , Discretion of Corporate Management t o  Do Good 
at rhe Expense or Shareholder Gain-A Survey of. Cllid Comm entary Oil, the U. S.  
Cor,uomr, Lmv,  13  CAN.t..DA- U . S .  L.J .  7 .  29-32 ( l 988) (questioning the deg ree to ·;;hich 
market disc i p l i ne operaies as an adequate check on management discretion in  the cor.lext 
of corporate philanthropy) . 
3 7 .  See ge!!emlfy Lawrence E. M itchel L  Coopermion and Constraint in rhe Modem 
Corpora/ion: A n  Inquiry into rile Causes of Corporcde lmmoraliry , 73 TEX. L. REV. 477 
( 1 995) (desc r ibing a conception of the corporation as moral actor) . 
3 8 .  See, e .g . , John H .  Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Cmpora!e Cooperation.  
Relationship lvianagemel!l, cmd the Trialogica/ lmpera:ive for CorporaJe Law,  78 �;f:'i,'! .  
l , .  REV. 1443 . 1 466-68 ( 1 994) . 
1 997] QUESTIONING PHILA NTHROPY.· COR PORA TE GOVERNA NCE 1099 
movement, defended their positions similarly in terms of a corporation ' s  
moral or social responsibility. 39 
The source of a corporation' s  moral obligations is unclear, however. 
Even if natural persons have obligations to " give something back to 
society, "  stemming from the nature of the human condition, the social 
contract, or religious principles-a question beyond the scope of this 
essal0-the existence of individual obligations does not resolve the 
question for the corporation. Corporations are not individuals, nor do 
they, by virtue of the corporate form, inherit all the rights and 
responsibilities of natural persons. 41 It is unnecessary to assume that the 
aggregation of investment funds and use of the corporate form for the 
purpose of pursuing a business objective necessarily carry social 
responsibilities apart from the obligations of the individual participants. 
Advocates of the stakeholder model of corporate governance disagree. 
Extrapolating from the arguments for corporate social responsibility 
articulated in the famous Dodd-Berle debate,42 they claim that a 
corporation is legally and morally obliged to consider the interests of the 
society in which it operates and to conduct its operations with a view 
toward serving those interests . 13 This position is supported by the 
proliferation of '' other constituency" statutes which allow and in some 
cases require directors to broaden their objectives in corporate decision­
making beyond profit maximization toward a consideration of the interests 
of nonshareholder constituencies. +1 
3 9 .  See E. Merrick Dodd. J r . .  For Vlho111 are Corporare ivfwwgers Trustees?, 45 
H.-'\RV .  L REV . 1 1 45 ( 1 932) .  
40 . For analysis o f  i ndiv idual g i v ing patterns based on prestige and " warm g l o w ·· 
see W i l l iam T. Harbaug h .  WhaJ Do Donations Buv ? (working paper on fi le  wi1h the 
author) . 
4 1 .  See J i l l  E. Fisch . Frw1kenstein 's Momter Hits rhe Campaign Trail: A n  A pproach 
ro Regulation of Corporme Polirica! Erpendirures. 32 WM. & MARY L REv. 5 8 7 .  630 
n. 227 ( ! 99 1 ) (descr ibing the :�cademic debate ovc:r the appropriate charactt:r ization o f  a 
corporation. including the -- personhood'' theory) .  But cf. Gregory Mark. The 
Personijlcarion of rhe Business Co;pormion in A merican Law, 54 U. CHI .  L REv. 1 44 1  
( l 9S7) (d iscussing conception of corpor·at ion a s  a person) : 
42 . See Dod d .  supra note 3 9 :  Adolph A. Ber le .  Jr . , For Whom Corporare _Managers 
A re Trustees: A Nore. 4 5  HARV. L REV. 1 365 ( 1 932) ;  see also Dav i s ,  supra note 36, 
at 1 7- 1 9  (dt:scr i b i ng the d,:bate ) .  
43.  See Davis .  supra note 3 6 ;  see also M a r k  E .  Van Der Weide.  A gainst Fiduciar_v 
Duties ro Corpurare SwJ.:eholders. 2 1  DEL. J .  CORP. L. 2 7  ( 1 996) (dt:Scribing the 
developrnem of the stakeholder model) .  
44 . See Committee on Corporate Laws. ABA, Orlzer Consriwencies Sta!Ures: 
Potenriai For Confusion. 45 Bus.  LAW . 225 3 ,  226 1 -63 ( 1 990) ; see generalLy Lawrence 
E. M i tche l ! .  A Theoreticai and Practiced Fram ework for Enforcing Corporate 
Consriwencv Srraures, 70 TEX. L REV. 579 ( ! 992) (defendi ng the use of other 
', {. 
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Even in states which have legislatively endorsed the stakeholder model 
of corporate governance , the characterization of p h ilanthropy as a 
corporate obl igation is inconsistent with existing practice . I f  phila nthropy 
is b ased on a corporation ' s  moral or social obligation-perhaps justified by 
the grant to corporations of special powers and legal rights ,  such as l im ited 
liability-why is  it optional? Corporations vary tremendously in their 
giving patterns ,45 from I B M ,  which donated $ 1 1 8 . 3  mil l ion to charity in 
1 992 alone ,46 to Sunbeam , whose CEO Albert Dunlap has publicly stated 
his opposition to corporate g iv ing and who , in his previous position, 
el iminated the charitable foundation at Scott Paper. 47 Why do regulators 
make no effort to monitor the degree to which corporations adhere to thei r  
obligation t o  society a n d  t o  e nforce noncompl iance w ith societal norms? 
The laxity o f  the current regime a llows complete free-riding by some 
corporations on the philanthropic efforts of others,  free-riding that may 
well  put socially responsible corporations at a competitive d isadvantage in 
the marketplace if  charity does not produce a benefit to the corporation.  
There are also problems with entrusting corporate moral obligations 
to the discretion of corporate management . In addition to the agency costs 
created by this delegation, it is not c lear that shareholders would wil l ingly 
grant management d iscretion to choose how much to give and which 
philanthropic causes to serve .  The exercise of this d iscretion , removed 
from the oversight of disclosure to or approval by shareholders . need have 
no connection to shareholder values or widely-held social priorities . �3 
Evidence on charitable giving provides some reason to doubt that 
corporate donations reflect the charitable objectives of individua l 
shareholders . Studies show that most indiv idual giving goes to religious 
organizations 49 S imilarly , when Berkshire H athaway , the one publ icly­
traded company to al low shareholders to des ignate charitable rec ipients , 
constituency statutes). 
45 .  See Sinclair & Galaskiewicz, supra note 30,  at 1 076-7 9 .  
4 6 .  See Benezra, supra note 3 2 ,  a t  4. 
47.  See David Altane r ,  Dunlap: No Chariry Here. S U :-.1-SENTINEL, Aug. 25 , 1 996 
at I F  (describing Dunlap as advocating an end to corporate support of charities). 
4 8 .  Corporate giving to elite institutions, such as funding for the arts, suggests 
curporate decision-making may not retlect general societal needs. As Linda Sugin has 
observed, corporations may also be more conservative than individual shareholders in 
their giving patterns, leading to a decrease in the range of philanthropic causes that are 
served. See Sugin, supra note 1 9 , at 85 1 .  
4 9 .  Comment, Must God Regulate Religious Corporations ? A Proposal For Reform 
of the Religious C01porarion Provisions of the Revised iol/odel Nonprofit Corporation A ct, 
42 E�>IORY L . J .  72 1 ,  72 1 -22 ( 1 993) (stating that religious organizat ions are the largest 
overall recipients of charitable contributions). 
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instituted "The Berkshire Program, " 50 i t  found that a large number of g i fts 
were made to charities w ith a religious affil iation . 51  The contribution 
policies of most publicly-held corporations , however, exp l i cit ly prohibit 
donations that are to be used for rel igious purpose s . 52 
Moreover,  to the extent that corporate social responsibi l ity i s  defended 
by attacking the private property model of the corporation and defining the 
corporation as something o f  a public resource,  voluntary charitable g iv ing 
seems a poor substitute for the traditional method of collecting and 
distributing funding for the public interest-the tax syste m .  If society 
views charities as serving general social needs,  the process of funding 
these needs through tax revenues and allocating the revenues throug h  the 
legislative process allows maj oritarian decis ion-making about the 
appropriate spending priorit ies .  Corporate contributions substitute the 
decisions of management for those o f  the voting public and its e lected 
representative s .  
The defense of charitable g iv ing in terms of the public  interest , raises 
a troubl i ng dimension to corporate philanthropy : the pol it ical nature of 
some charitable spending . M any prominently philanthrop ic corporations 
are those i nvolved i n  heav i l y  regula ted industrie s .  Phi l ip M orris and 
Exxon exempl ify the efforts of companies subj ect to extensive regulation 
to d isplay their public-spiritedness through charitable giving . 53 Donations 
of this typ e ,  which qttempt to buy not merely publ ic  but also legis lative 
goodwill . may be analogized to lobby ing . Indeed.  corporations may direct 
their giving to the causes fav ored by those pol iticians viewed as l ikely to 
impose greater regulatory restrictions , in an effort to deter intrusive 
regulation. This rationale might explain why Exxon is a prominent donor 
50. Berkshire Hathaway ins t i tuted the Be rksh i re Pmgram i n  1 98 1 .  For a descript ion 
o f  the prog ram see Warren Buffen's Letter to Shareholders. The B erkshire Hathaway 
Annual Report ( 1 98 1 ) ,  repr inted in  The Essays of Warren Buffell, 1 9  CARDOZO L. REv. 
(forthcoming 1 997) [he re i nafter Essays] . 
5 1. See Warr e n  Buffett ' s  Lc:tter to Shareholders,  The Berkshire Hathaway Annual 
Report ( 1 99 3 ) ,  reprinted in id. 
5 2 .  See, e. g . . EXXON CORP. A PPLICATION [:"FORMATION S HEET (on fi l e  with the 
New York Law Schoof Law Re1·iew) (swing that Exxon d,Jes ·· not provide funds to be 
used for re l i g ious or pol itical purposes '' ) ;  MOBIL FO L5:\D:HION. lei C . ,  GRANT G U I DELI:<ES 
3 [hereinafter MOBIL GR.".NT GUIDELINES] (st�ning that g rams are not made to " re l i g ious 
organ izatinns fnr rei i g ious purposes'' ) .  CDrporate g iving is  subject to other restrictions. 
For e.xampie
. 
Mub i l a lso chooses not tll support organizations "concerned with specific 
diseases " and " veterans and m i l i tary organizat ions . .. See MOBIL G RANT G U IDELINES. 
supra at 3 .  
5 3 .  In 1 99 5 .  for example,  Exxon made contr ibut ions tota l l i ng $55 m i l l ion d i rectly 
and tl.;ough the Exxon Foundation . DIMENSIO!\S 9 5 .  A REPORT ON EXXON ' S  1 995 
CONTRIBUTIONS iN THE PUBLIC INTEREST lNCL UDI�iG THE EXXON EDUCATION 
FOUNDATION REPORT 3 ( 1 996) . 
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t o  environmental cause s .  54 Unlike d irect political expenditures ,  c haritable 
giving rarely incurs the negative publ ic  opinion response associated w ith 
l obbying . M oreover, in an era i n  which pol itical contribut ions are subj ect 
to increasing scrutiny , we should not overlook the potential  o f  charitable 
spend ing to influence the pol itical process . 55 
To the extent that corporate philanthropy has a political dimension,  it 
may also create internal corporate confl ict.  Controversy about AT&T ' s 
donations to P lanned Parenthood56 and Domino Pizza ' s  support for the 
Right to Life movement57 demonstrates the potential political problems 
associated with corporate philanthropy . 58  Neither tax regulations nor 
corporate governance guidelines designate appropriate beneficiaries o f  
corporate l argess ,  relying instead upon the t a x  exempt status o f  charitable 
recip ients as a proxy for their suitab il ity . However, charitabl e  donations 
that allow corporations to take pol itical positions inconsistent with those 
of their shareholders pose similar First Amendment questions to those that 
have been raised in the debate over regulation of corp orate polit ical  
speech . 59 
54. See id. at 8- 1 0  ( l i sting Exxon's  contributions w environmental causes in  1 995) . 
See also Craig Smith ,  The New Corpora1e Phi/amhropy , HARV . Bus.  REv. , M ay 1 994 , 
at 1 0 5  (describing concern that Arco m ight develop too c lose a relJt ionship w i t h  the 
environmental groups w which i t  contributes) . 
5 5 .  See. e.g. , Barry D .  Karl , Tlte Evolwion of Corporate Granrmaking In A merica, 
in T H E  CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS HANDBOOK 20 (James P. Shannon ed . ,  1 99 1 )  
(stat ing that corporate g iv i ng has a l lowed corporations to intl uence " publ ic  p o l icy d i rect ly 
th rough the power to decide how their comributions to publ ic  w e l l -being \VOuld be spent 
rather  than leaving such decisions to pol it ical negotiat ions· ) .  
5 6 .  See Gregory E .  o�vid,  Of Grants and Grief: Try ing t o  D o  Good CW1 Som l'limes 
Keep a Company from Doing Well, FIN.  WORLD, Aug . 3, 1 993 , at 64 (describing 
comroversy generated by AT & T ' s  donations to P lanned Parenthood and subsequent 
decision to end that support in response to pressure from pro- l i fe  organizations as ·' the 
mother of all phi l anthropic controversies '' ) .  
5 7 .  The uonations to the Right t o  Life movement are actua l l y  made b y  Dom i no ' s  
Pizza founder and C E O  Thomas Monagha n .  See Jus! Say No: Bovcol/s ar 1he Barricades , 
NEWSWEEK. Aug . 1 4 .  1 989 .  at 21 (describing boycotts of Domino ·s Pizza by the National  
Organizat ion for Women) . 
5 8 .  See Smith.  supra note 5 4 ,  at 1 0 5 ,  I l l  (describing Planned Parenthood ' s  response 
to AT &T's dec is inn to deny funding as a '' costly embarrassment for AT&T " ) .  
5 9 .  See, e.g. , First N a t ' l  Bank v .  Bel lott i ,  4 3 5  U . S .  765 . 792-95 ( 1 97 8 )  (!'ej ecting 
protection of Fi rst Amendment rights of d i ssent ing shareholuers as just ification for statute 
restrict ing corporate pol i t ical  speech) : see also F isch, supra note 4 1  at  6 3 5 -42 ( 1 99 1 )  
(exam ining the degree to which exist ing corporate law doctrines can and should address 
shareholuer  concerns about corporate p o l i tical  speech ) :  see generally A l a n  J .  Meese . 
L im irmions on Corporme Speech: Protection for Shareholders or A bridgmem of 
E1pression 7. 2 Wtvt. & MARY BILL OF RTS . J. 305 ( 1 993) (examining shareholder 
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The polit ical  d imension of corporate g iving is particularly relevant to 
Faith Kahn's  proposal that the SEC mandate more extensive disclosure of 
charitable g iving by corporations . 60 Although many corporations 
voluntarily d isclose their charitable donations in separate philanthropy 
l iterature such as charitable giving pamphlets , as Faith observe s ,  there is 
v irtuall y  no disclosure about charitable donations in investor-rela ted 
information such as annual  reports . 6 1 If corporations donate because 
giving creates goodwi l l  and favorable publ ic ity beneficial to the 
corporation or out of a sense of moral obl igation or a l truism, we wou ld 
expect to see extensive pub l ic ity associated with corporate philanthropy 
even i n  the absence of SEC-mandated disclosure . Greater publ icity for 
corporate giving would appear to further the obj ectives behind the 
donations . M oreover,  even if corporations did not d irect disclosure of 
their philanthropy to the investment markets,  if a corporation ' s  
phil anthropic practices were relevant to i t s  profitab i l ity , w e  would expect 
to see securities analysts research and distribute the informat ion 1s material 
to investors . 
The fa ilure of corporate giving practices to draw invesrm attention 
may result from the relatively l imited disclosure provided by 
corporations 62 The political aspect of phi lanthropy suggests a reason for 
corporations to l imit disclosure . I f  corporations do m:te to polit icall y  
controversial sources o r  the gifts are made in an attempt t o  obtain pol itical 
infl uence . disclosure may generate negative pub l icity and be adverse to the 
interests of the corporation 63 
I I I .  CONCLUSION 
U nde rstand ing why corporations donate w charity is an i mp0rnnt fi rsr 
step in evaluating corporate philanthropy and formulating an appropr iate 
response from the perspective of corporate governance; . F<1ith Kahn has 
furthered this endeavor substantially w ith her org;:mization of this 
sympos JUm . As the preceding analysis indicates.  the iTl ::l. lmei- in  'Nh ich 
corporate law should regulate corporate philanthropy requires further 
exploration of a number of issue s .  many of which benefit from the 
interd isc ipl inary work demonstrated in this conference The researcr: 
---- - -·-----------·- ----
prnt�ction just ification for regulating corporate speech). 
60 . See Kah n .  supra n01e 9, at 623 .  
6 1 .  Sel! id. 
62. See L\r-tES T .  BE�i-'iETT. PATTERNS OF CORPORATE PH!LV·fri-!ROP'/ 1 0  ( i 989) 
(descr ib ing corporate managers as ''secrt:t ive" about corporate ph i i antl1ropy) 
63 . See Dav i d .  sl!pra note 56, at 64-65 (describing " pol i tiC3i Yi ,-c�slvffl ! o  .. crnt may 
result from corporate comributions to controversial recipient s ) .  
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e fforts taking place in business schoo l s ,  non-profit organizat ions,  and 
government agencies,  are creating a more integrated p icture of the role o f  
philanthropy in for-profit  business . 
This conference , and this essay , offer suggestions about where to start 
in creating a framework w ithin which to understand corporate 
phi lanthrop y .  Ultimatel y ,  whether the law should a llow or e ncourage 
corporate g iv ing requires corporate lawyers to address three distinct 
questions . -
First ,  is corporate g iv ing good for business'� Even under a narrow 
characterization of business  obj ectives as profit maximization , existing 
studies have been unable to determine the relationship , if  any . between 
corporate philanthropy and profitab i l ity . Further research in this area, to 
the extent i t  can overcome the technical difficul ties noted above . is sorely 
needed . Empirical evidence may allow us to weigh the c la im that 
philanthropy is good for bus iness against the alternative characterization 
of corporate giving as management self-deali ng . 
Second . is g iv ing good for shareholders'7 A i t hough the slatus of the 
shareholder primacy model in corporate law is unclear.  shareholder 
interests remain a principal reason for the adopt i on of regulatory 
standard s .  Even if corporate philanthropy has no discernabte effect on the 
bottom l ine,  corporate giv ing may fu rther shau=holders · interests under a 
social responsibil ity , altru ism , or common objective rPociel of the 
corporat ion . Here too .  further research .wenues exist . ' \Vould 
shareholders voluntarily vote to authorize corporate philan thropy? What 
efforts have shareholders made to preveni corporate g iv ing? Do 
shareho lders v iew corporate giving as a subsr i ture for their own giving 
and , if so . does corporate giving provide a satisfactory substitute? 
This analysis extends beyond the question of whether corporations 
should donate and suggests issues about the manner in which corporations 
set their donation pol icy . Although Berkshire Hath a way ha::; innovated a 
procedure for shareholders to designate the  reci.p;ents of corporate 
phi lanthropy, there is  no evidence that this porcer:ds a general trend for 
;::orpora tions to provide shareholders with greatet control over giving 
policies or the choice of c haritable beneficiaries Panicular iy ,  if corporate 
philanthropy i s  just i fied a s  derivarive of  shareho!ckrs ' mor::: l ohligatio ns ,  
it  i s  unc lear that the existing Irlanagtrial struc�ure of t h e  firn1 offers an 
approp;-iate vehicle for sharehoiders to delegate the satisfact ion of these 
obl igations . Indeed , the broad discretion traditionai ly a fforded to 
management may pose a risk to shareholders ' i;1tere:>IS amlogou.s to that 
presented by management ' s control over corporate pol i tical activity . 
Third . is corporate g iving good for sociery'' The jusr ifications for 
corporate phi l anthropy based on principles of sociai responsibi lity rest 
upon the view that ,  whether or not corporeote giving caus�s a corporation 
w do wel l ,  giving money to charity constitutes doing good.  This 
perspective is reflected in t:he exis[ing trtatn1tT�!. c:f :-:orporate philanthropy 
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under both tax and corporate law.  The substantive conclusion that 
corporate g iving is good for society is premised on two dist inct 
components :  1) charitable g iving is generally good , and 2)  some charitable 
g iv ing should take p lace at the corporate , as opposed to the individual ,  
leve l .  
Analysis of the first point i s  beyond the scope of this essay . 
Accepting the premise that charitable g iv ing is good however,  does not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that charitable g iv ing by corporations 
is desirable . It is  possible to hypothesize that corporate contributions raise 
overall soc ietal giving levels ,  that corporations are able to donate more 
efficiently , or corporate decision-makers are better abl e  to determi ne 
soc ietal needs than individual s .  Addressing these hypotheses suggests a 
need for corporate law to recognize the quasi-public role created for 
management in al locating funds generated by private property and 
enhanced through the tax subsidy , to social program s .  
It  is  difficul t  to s e e  w h y  corporate executives a r e  particularly qual ified 
to prioritize social expenditure s .  The attributes that qual ify an individual 
to manage a corporation are not obviously l inked to the ability to identify 
social needs and structure spending decisions to address those needs . Nor 
i s  it  l ikely that corporate shareholders , in choosi ng boards of directors , 
bel ieve they are selecting for these qua l it ies .  Most importantly,  the 
selection of corporate decision-makers is a private decision made 
exclusively by the corporation ' s  shareholders . Corporate manager s ,  unlike 
political official s ,  are not accountable to the general pub l ic . Del egating 
discretion over the funding of social programs to the private sector creates 
a risk that the results will differ from the priorities set through the 
democratic process .  
